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Abstract
We study a continuous-time version of the optimal risk-sharing problem with one-
sided commitment. In the optimal contract, the agent’s consumption is non-decreasing
and depends only on the maximal level of the agent’s income realized to date. In the
complete-markets implementation of the optimal contract, the Alvarez-Jermann solvency
constraints take the form of a simple borrowing constraint familiar from the Bewley-Aiyagari
incomplete-markets models. Unlike in the incomplete-markets models, however, the asset
buffer stock held by the agent is negatively correlated with income.
1 Introduction
Individuals, firms, and sovereigns alike face limits on the amounts they can borrow. In
this paper, we show how borrowing constraints (credit limits) emerge as a key element of an
optimal contractual arrangement in a risk-sharing problem subject to limited commitment.
In our model, a simple credit limit is precisely what differentiates the optimal risk-sharing
arrangement with limited commitment from the optimal risk-sharing arrangement with full
commitment. In addition, we show that the optimal risk-sharing with limited commitment
implies that the financial buffer stock (assets in excess of the credit limit) is negatively correlated
with income. This prediction stands in stark contrast to the implications of the incomplete-
markets models of self-insurance, in which the financial buffer stock is positively correlated with
income.
Our analysis has two parts. In the first part, we study an optimal contracting problem be-
tween a risk-neutral, fully-committed, deep-pocketed principal and a risk-averse, non-committed
agent whose stochastic income process is a geometric Brownian motion. Autarky represents
the agent’s outside option. All information is public. In this setting, we show that under the
optimal contract the agent’s consumption can be represented as a strictly increasing function of
the maximal level of the agent’s income realized to date. In the optimal contract, therefore, the
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consumption path of the agent is weakly increasing and constant whenever current income is
strictly below its to-date maximum but strictly increasing when income achieves a new all-time
maximum. At all times, the optimal amount of risk-sharing is less than full. If the agent’s
preferences exhibit constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA), his optimal consumption is simply
given by a constant fraction of the maximal level of his income realized to date.
In the second part, we study a simple trading mechanism that implements efficient alloca-
tions. This mechanism consists of two trading accounts that work as follows. The principal
makes available to the agent a bank account, in which the agent can save or borrow at a riskless
interest rate equal to the principal’s and agent’s common rate of time preference. The principal
also gives the agent access to a hedging account, in which the agent can transfer his income
risk to the principal with fair-odds pricing. In the hedging account, the agent faces no limits
on the size of the hedge he can take out, i.e., he can transfer 100 percent of his income risk to
the principal. In the bank account, however, the agent faces a borrowing limit. The borrowing
limit is always greater than zero, i.e., the agent has access to credit. The size of the borrowing
limit depends only on the agent’s current level of income, and has a simple characterization:
it is equal to the total value of the relationship between the principal and the agent. In this
mechanism, the agent can freely choose his trading strategy and his consumption process. As
well, the agent can default (revert to permanent autarky) at any point in time.
We show that under these conditions, the agent’s equilibrium (that is, individually-optimal)
trading strategy results in an efficient allocation of consumption. This two-account trading
mechanism, thus, implements efficient risk sharing. In equilibrium, the agent never defaults
and, despite being able to fully hedge his income risk at any point in time, the agent chooses
a hedging strategy that less-than-fully insures his income risk at all times. Also, we show that
the financial buffer stock that the agent maintains in equilibrium is negatively correlated with
his income.
In an environment otherwise identical to ours but in which the agent can fully commit,
any efficient allocation of consumption, clearly, would provide the agent with full insurance.
Such allocations can be implemented with a combination of a hedging account with no restric-
tions on hedging and a riskless bank account with no restrictions on borrowing (other than
a never-binding no-Ponzi-scheme condition). Furthermore, it is clear that the trading mech-
anism in which borrowing limits are absent would not implement any efficient allocation of
the limited-commitment environment. This is because over the desired no-default equilibrium
strategy the agent would prefer to accumulate debt and default. The limited-commitment op-
timum, therefore, is implementable if and only if the agent faces the borrowing constraint. In
our model, thus, a simple borrowing constraint is precisely the difference between an optimal
trading mechanism in the limited-commitment environment (in which default risk is present)
and an optimal trading mechanism in the full-commitment environment (in which default risk
is absent). Our model pinpoints the role of the borrowing constraint. Namely, this role is to
efficiently mitigate the default risk.
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Relation to the literature Our paper is not the first one to identify a role for restrictions
on borrowing in mitigating the risk of default. In the existing literature, this role has been
studied in two contexts.
First, it has been studied in equilibrium models of borrowing and default that exogenously
restrict the contract structure to debt contracts (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)). In these
models, the equilibrium credit limits and other costs to access credit are not necessarily opti-
mal. In contrast, our analysis imposes no restrictions on the structure of the contract. The
equilibrium credit limits that we obtain are optimal, i.e., a part of a mechanism supporting the
optimal level of risk sharing with limited commitment.
Second, Alvarez and Jermann (2000) study a general equilibrium economy with limited
commitment and impose no exogenous restrictions on the structure of the contract. They
show that optimal allocations can be implemented via decentralized trade in a complete set
of state-contingent claims if agents face solvency constraints that prevent default. The sol-
vency constraints of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) take the form of limits on portfolios of state-
contingent claims. Our model is essentially a continuous-time, partial-equilibrium version of
the Alvarez-Jermann model with one-sided commitment. Our analysis shows that in this set-
ting the state-contingent solvency constraints collapse to a simple borrowing constraint, which,
literally, is a limit on the amount the agent can borrow. Thus, the borrowing constraint that
emerges in our version of the Alvarez-Jermann model has the same form as the classic borrowing
constraints of the Bewley-type models, which have been widely used in macroeconomics and
finance.
This simplification in the form of the endogenous restrictions on borrowing allows us to
compare our Alvarez-Jermann-type complete-markets model with the Bewley-type incomplete-
markets model. Clearly, the key difference between these two models is the availability of
hedging. Our analysis shows an important implication of this difference: the role of financial
wealth. We show that, although the agent’s total wealth (i.e., his financial wealth plus the
present value of his future income) is positively correlated with current income, the correlation
between the agent’s current income and his financial buffer stock (i.e., his bank account balance
in excess of the credit limit) is negative. This feature of our model stands in stark contrast to
Bewley-type incomplete-markets models, in which the correlation between the agents’ income
and financial buffer stock is positive.
In addition to Alvarez and Jermann (2000), our paper is closely related to other papers
studying optimal contracts and equilibrium outcomes in environments with commitment fric-
tions. Contributions to this literature include Harris and Holmstrom (1982), Thomas and
Worral (1988), Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Krueger and Perri (2006), Krueger and Uhlig (2006).
Our paper extends the analysis to a continuous-time setting with persistent shocks, which al-
lows for closed-form solutions and a detailed characterization of the dynamics of the optimal
contract and its implementation. In particular, the continuous time structure allows us to sign
the correlation between the financial buffer stock and income. As we show in Appendix C,
however, our method for the characterization of the optimal contract is not specific to our
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continuous-time framework.
Krueger and Perri (2006) compare the implications of Alvarez-Jermann-type models and
Bewley-type models for the relation between income inequality and consumption inequality, as
well as confront these implications with U.S. data. In the discussion of their quantitative results,
they note that the correlation between assets and income is negative in the Alvarez-Jermann-
type model, but they do not provide analytical results. We prove this result analytically.
Also, because we characterize the optimal contract in closed form and show that the borrowing
constraint in the implementation corresponds to the principal’s maximized profit, we can easily
compute the borrowing constraints with no need for the fixed-point iteration procedure used in
Alvarez and Jermann (2000). In particular, we show that the optimal borrowing constraint is
proportional to the agent’s current income when the preferences of the agent satisfy CRRA.
Our paper is also related to several recent studies of optimal contracting problems in contin-
uous time with private information.1 In particular, our proof of the optimality of the contract
is based on the techniques developed in Sannikov (2008). Our analysis suggests that limited-
commitment environments are more tractable than private information environments, both in
the study of the optimal allocation and its implementation. In particular, in our model we can
provide closed-form solutions without value function iteration or having to solve a second-order
differential equation.
Organization In Section 2, we present the environment and a general class of contracting
problems we study. In Section 3, we characterize the solutions to these problems. In Section
4, we study implementation and provide characterization of optimal policies. In Section 5, we
discuss extensions. In Section 6, we sum up our conclusions. Appendix A contains proofs of
all lemmas and propositions presented in the text. Appendix B contains a formal verification
argument for the optimality of the contract characterized in Section 3. Appendix C extends
our analysis to a class of discrete-time models with persistence.
2 The contracting problem
Consider the following dynamic contracting problem in continuous time. There is a risk-
neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. Let w be a standard Brownian motion w = {wt,Ft; 0 ≤
t < ∞} on a probability space (Ω,F ,P). The agent’s income process y = {yt,Ft; 0 ≤ t < ∞}
is a geometric Brownian motion, i.e., for t ≥ 0
yt = y0 exp(αt+ σwt),
where y0 ∈ R++, α ∈ R, and σ ∈ R++.
We assume that the principal and the agent discount at a common rate r. Preferences of
1E.g., Demarzo and Sannikov (2007), Biais et al. (2007), Sannikov (2008), Piskorski and Tchistyi (forthcom-
ing), He (2009), Zhang (2009).
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the agent are represented by the expected utility function
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(ct)dt
]
,
where ct is the agent’s consumption at time t, u : R++ → R is a strictly increasing and concave
smooth period utility function, and E is the expectations operator. The agent’s income process
y is publicly observable by both the principal and the agent. Since the agent is risk averse and
the principal is risk neutral, there are gains from trade to be realized between the principal
and the agent. The principal offers the agent a long-term contract in which he provides the
agent with a consumption allocation c = {ct; t ≥ 0} in return for the agent’s income process y.
We require that c be progressively measurable with respect to the filtration {Ft; t ≥ 0}. The
principal’s discounted cost of a contract with the agent’s consumption c is given by
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt(ct − yt)dt
]
.
To ensure that the value of the agent’s income process is finite, we restrict parameters to
satisfy
r > α+
σ2
2
, (1)
that is, we assume that the common discount rate is larger than the average growth rate of the
income process. We will denote α+ σ2/2 by µ. Also, for any t, the present value of the agent’s
future income (i.e., the agent’s “human capital,” or “human wealth”) will be denoted by P (yt).
Using the fact that E[yt+s|Ft] = yt exp(µs) for any t, s > 0, we have that
P (yt) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rsyt+sds|Ft
]
=
yt
r − µ. (2)
The principal can commit to a contract, but the agent cannot. In particular, the agent
is always free to walk away from the principal and consume his income. If he does, he loses
all future insurance possibilities, i.e., he has to remain in autarky forever. Because income
is persistent, the value that the autarky option presents to the agent depends on the current
income level. Denoting this value by Vaut(yt), we have
Vaut(yt) = E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rsu(yt+s)ds|Ft
]
.
Let vt denote the conditional expected utility of the agent under allocation c from time t
onwards:
vt = E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rsu(ct+s)ds|Ft
]
. (3)
The agent will have no incentive to renege on the contract with the principal if the following
participation constraint,
vt ≥ Vaut(yt),
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holds at each date t and in every state ω ∈ Ω. An allocation that satisfies these participation
constraints will be called enforceable.
We consider a family of contracting problems indexed by y0 and V¯ , where V¯ ≥ Vaut(y0) is
the total utility value that the principal must deliver to the agent. For each pair (y0, V¯ ) ∈ Θ ≡
{(y, v) : y > 0, v ≥ Vaut(y)}, the principal’s problem is to design an enforceable allocation c that
delivers to the agent utility V¯ at a minimum cost C(y0, V¯ ). That is, the principal’s problem at
(y0, V¯ ) is
C(y0, V¯ ) = min
c
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt(ct − yt)dt
]
(4)
s.t. vt ≥ Vaut(yt), all t and ω, (5)
v0 = V¯ .
Any contract that solves this problem will be called efficient. Let c(y0, V¯ ) denote an efficient
contract in the planner’s problem at (y0, V¯ ). For each (y0, V¯ ) ∈ Θ, the contract consumption
allocation c(y0, V¯ ) is a process on (Ω, F ,P) progressively measurable with respect to the fil-
tration {Ft}. Let Ψ = {c(y0, V¯ ); (y0, V¯ ) ∈ Θ} denote the family of all efficient contracts. Our
task is to characterize the contracts in Ψ.
3 Efficient contracts
This section is devoted to the characterization of efficient contracts. In order to provide eco-
nomic intuition, we first derive the efficient contracts heuristically and give the main properties
of these contracts. The formal verification of optimality is done in subsection 3.5. We start out
by considering the contracting problems in which all surplus is given to the principal. That is,
for a given y0, let V¯ = Vaut(y0). We postpone the analysis of the problems with V¯ > Vaut(y0)
until subsection 3.3.
Let us first review the case of full commitment. The optimal contract under full commit-
ment provides full insurance to the agent. Since the principal and the agent discount at the
same rate, the optimal full-commitment contract provides the agent with constant consumption
u−1(Vaut(y0)). Under this contract, the agent’s continuation value is constant, i.e., vt = Vaut(y0)
at all dates t and in every state ω ∈ Ω.
Under one-sided commitment, this full-insurance contract is not feasible because the agent’s
autarky value Vaut(yt) will exceed Vaut(y0) when yt exceeds y0 for the first time. At this time,
the full-insurance contract would violate the agent’s participation constraint. As long as yt does
not exceed y0, however, the participation constraint does not bind. Inside the time interval in
which yt fluctuates below the initial level y0, thus, the principal’s profit maximization problem
is the same under both one-sided and full commitment. Therefore, the consumption path that
the principal optimally provides to the agent during this time must be constant in the one-sided
commitment case, as it is in the case of full commitment.
We now calculate the level of consumption that the principal will optimally provide to the
agent during this time interval. A technical difficulty associated with this calculation stems from
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the fact that the length of the time interval in which the principal can provide full insurance
is zero, i.e., inft{t > 0 : yt > y0} = 0 almost surely.2 To deal with this difficulty, we first relax
the principal’s problem by a small amount and construct an optimal contract in the relaxed
problem. Then we take a limit of the optimal contract as the size of the relaxation amount
goes to zero. Finally, we check that the limiting contract is feasible in the unrelaxed problem.
We fix ε > 0 and drop the agent’s participation constraints vt ≥ Vaut(yt) for all t < τy0+ε,
where τy0+ε = mint {t > 0 : yt = y0 + ε} is the first time when the agent’s income reaches y0 +ε.
Because ε is strictly positive, τy0+ε > 0 almost surely, and thus the time interval [0, τy0+ε) has
non-zero length. In this relaxed problem, there are no participation constraints inside [0, τy0+ε)
and thus the principal provides full insurance to the agent over this time interval. At τy0+ε, the
principal provides the agent with continuation value
vτy0+ε = Vaut(y0 + ε), (6)
as this value constitutes the minimal departure from the full-commitment contract. This de-
parture is necessary to ensure that the agent’s participation constraint vt ≥ Vaut(yt) is satisfied
at τy0+ε.
Under the above contract, the agent’s utility flow inside the interval [0, τy0+ε) is constant.
We will denote this utility flow level by u¯ε(y0). Using this notation and equation (6), the
agent’s expected utility from this contact can be split into the part before and after time τy0+ε
as follows:
v0 = E
[∫ τy0+ε
0
re−rtu¯ε(y0)dt+ e−rτy0+εVaut(y0 + ε)
]
.
Since the value being provided to the agent is V¯ = Vaut(y0), the constant utility flow rate u¯ε(y0)
must be chosen at a level at which v0 = Vaut(y0). Thus, u¯ε(y0) satisfies
Vaut(y0) = E
[∫ τy0+ε
0
re−rtu¯ε(y0)dt+ e−rτy0+εVaut(y0 + ε)
]
. (7)
Note also that under autarky, the autarky value Vaut(y0) can also be split into the value of the
consumption of income received up to the time τy0+ε and after:
Vaut(y0) = E
[∫ τy0+ε
0
re−rtu(yt)dt+ e−rτy0+εVaut(y0 + ε)
]
. (8)
Comparing (7) and (8) and canceling common terms, we obtain
E
[∫ τy0+ε
0
re−rtu¯ε(y0)dt
]
= E
[∫ τy0+ε
0
re−rtu(yt)dt
]
.
Thus, the utility flow rate u¯ε(y0) is the certainty equivalent of the stochastic utility flow rate
that the agent receives under autarky over the time interval [0, τy0+ε). For any ε > 0, the
2This is because a typical path of Brownian motion has infinite variation and thus crosses y0 infinitely many
times immediately after t = 0.
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optimal contract in the relaxed problem simply delivers full insurance until τy0+ε, and the
minimal continuation value required to satisfy the participation constraint at time τy0+ε.
By taking ε to zero, we now obtain the formula for the certainty equivalent utility flow rate
u¯(y0) in the unrelaxed planner’s problem:
u¯(y0) = lim
ε→0
u¯ε(y0)
= lim
ε→0
E[
∫ τy0+ε
0 re
−rtu(yt)dt]
E[
∫ τy0+ε
0 re
−rtdt]
= lim
ε→0
Vaut(y0)− E[e−rτy0+ε ]Vaut(y0 + ε)
1− E[e−rτy0+ε ] .
Denote 1− E[e−rτy0+ε ] by g(ε). Then, applying d’Hospital’s rule and using g(0) = 0, we get
u¯(y0) = lim
ε→0
g′(ε)Vaut(y0 + ε)− (1− g(ε))V ′aut(y0 + ε)
g′(ε)
= Vaut(y0)− V ′aut(y0)/g′(0).
This expression for the certainty equivalent utility flow rate is intuitive. Note that g(ε) ≈
g′(0)ε is the amount of discounted time spent before hitting y0 + ε, the income level at which
the participation constraint binds. If the constraint never binds, as is the case in the full-
commitment case, then the discount factor at the hitting time is zero (i.e., E[e−rτy0+ε ] = 0) and
g′(0) ≈ ∞, in which case the formula for u¯(y0) collapses to the full-commitment level Vaut(y0).
In the limited-commitment case, the income level at which the participation constraint binds,
y0 + ε, is expected to be reached in finite time. At this time, τy0+ε, the agent expects to receive
V ′aut(y0)ε units of extra continuation utility. Thus, the constant flow rate u¯(y0) over the interval
[0, τy0+ε) is reduced below the full-commitment level Vaut(y0) by the amount of the expected
gain V ′aut(y0)ε divided by the expected discounted waiting time g′(0)ε, which is reflected in the
above formula for u¯.
Using the structure of the agent’s income process y, we can characterize the certainty
equivalent utility flow rate more closely. Borodin and Salminen (2002, page 622) show that
if y = {yt,Ft; 0 ≤ t <∞} is the geometric Brownian motion, then for any y ≥ y0
E[e−rτy ] =
(
y0
y
)κ
, (9)
where
κ =
(√
α2 + 2rσ2 − α
)
σ−2 (10)
is a strictly positive constant.3 Thus, g′(0) = κ/y0 and
u¯(y0) = Vaut(y0)− κ−1y0V ′aut(y0).
Having described the contract inside the initial time interval [0, τy0+ε), let us now consider
the continuation contract starting at time τy0+ε . As we noted before, since the participation
3In fact, (1) implies that κ > 1.
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constraint binds at τy0+ε, the agent’s continuation value at τy0+ε equals his autarky value
Vaut(y0 + ε). The principal’s problem of designing a profit-maximizing contract is thus the
same at t = τy0+ε as it was at t = 0 but with the new initial value V¯ = Vaut(y0 + ε) and the
new initial income state y0 + ε. The solution to this problem, therefore, must be the same:
Consumption is stabilized until the agent’s income exceeds y0 + ε for the first time. The flow
utility provided in the meantime, u¯(y0 +ε), is at the level necessary to deliver value Vaut(y0 +ε)
to the agent given that the autarky value will be delivered to the agent as of the future moment
when income first exceeds y0 + ε. The same steps we used earlier to calculate u¯(y0) let us now
calculate u¯(y0 + ε) = Vaut(y0 + ε)− κ−1(y0 + ε)V ′aut(y0 + ε). And so forth.
Repeating this construction for all dates and possible realizations of income paths, we note
that under the resulting contract, current utility flow delivered to the agent at any t is de-
termined by the maximum level the income path attained up to time t. Denote this level
by
mt = max
0≤s≤t
ys.
Whenever income yt is strictly below mt, the value of mt remains constant. As we argued
earlier, at these times it is efficient to provide the agent with constant consumption flow. Thus,
mt can be used as a state variable sufficient to determine current consumption flow given to
the agent under this contract.
In sum, we have argued (so far heuristically) that the optimal contract delivering the value
V¯ = Vaut(y0) to the agent is given as follows. At any t ≥ 0, the agent’s consumption is given
by
ct = u−1(u¯(mt)), (11)
where u¯ : R++ → R is
u¯(y) = Vaut(y)− κ−1yV ′aut(y), (12)
and where the constant κ > 1 is given in (10).
Next, we provide some basic properties of this contract. Our heuristic discussion provides
simple intuition why this contract is in fact optimal. We postpone the formal verification of this
intuition to subsection 3.5. Also, we still need to check that this contract, which we obtained
as a limit of optimal contracts from relaxed problems, does satisfy all participation constraints
in the unrelaxed problem. We check this later in this section, after we provide basic properties
of the contract.
3.1 Increasing consumption paths
We see in (11) that consumption ct is constant when yt fluctuates below mt. Intuitively,
this is optimal because the agent’s participation constraint is not binding during these times.
Under (11), the agent’s consumption changes only when yt attains a new all-time maximum.
Intuitively, this adjustment is necessary because the participation constraint of the agent binds
at this time. Consistent with this intuition, consumption ct increases when a new all-time
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maximum is realized. To see that this in fact is the case, note that u−1 is strictly increasing,
and, by the following lemma, so is u¯.
Lemma 1 u¯ is strictly increasing and u¯ < u.
Proof In Appendix A. 
The above lemma verifies that u−1(u¯(·)) is a strictly increasing function. Since the process
mt is weakly increasing, (11) implies that the agent’s consumption paths are weakly increasing
for any ω. In particular, the agent’s consumption path is constant when yt < mt and it increases
whenever yt = mt. It is a standard result in the mathematics of Brownian motion that yt < mt
at almost all t, and yt = mt occurs on a set of Lebesgue measure zero.4 Thus, consumption ct
is constant at almost all dates t. Moreover, because u¯ < u, we have that ct < mt at all t. In
particular, we have c0 < y0. This means that the contract begins with net payments from the
agent to the principal, which is akin to prepayment of an insurance premium.
Example If utility is logarithmic, u(c) = log(c), then
Vaut(yt) = E
[∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t) log(ys)ds|Ft
]
=
∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t) (log(y0) + αs+ σE[ws+t|Ft]) ds
=
∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t)(log(y0) + αt+ α(s− t) + σwt)ds
= log(yt)
∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t)ds+ α
∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t)(s− t)ds
= log(yt) +
α
r
.
So
u¯(y) = Vaut(y)− κ−1yV ′aut(y)
= log(y) +
α
r
− 1
κ
= log(y)− κσ
2
2r
,
where the last line follows from an easy-to-verify equality
α
r
+
κσ2
2r
=
1
κ
. (13)
Applying the inverse utility function u−1(u) = exp(u), we thus get
ct = u−1(u¯(mt))
= mt exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)
.
4See Karatzas and Shreve (1991) for proof.
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Thus, with log preferences, the agent consumes a constant fraction of his to-date maximal
income mt. Similar calculations show that the same is true for any constant relative risk-
aversion (CRRA) utility function. 
To understand the structure of the optimal contract a little better, let us discuss how it
delivers the initial utility Vaut(y0) to the agent over time. The monotonicity of the consumption
paths allows us to see this structure very clearly. For any ω, the agent’s utility flow u(ct) = u¯(mt)
is weakly increasing in t. The total discounted utility of the agent, thus, depends on how fast
the utility flow path {u(ct); 0 ≤ t <∞} attains higher and higher levels. Note now that for any
x > y0, we have u(ct) ≥ u¯(x) if and only if mt ≥ x. Thus,
min{t : u(ct) ≥ u¯(x)} = min{t : mt ≥ x} = min{t : yt = x} = τx. (14)
This means that the utility flow u(ct) attains the level u¯(x) for the first time precisely at τx, i.e.,
when income yt hits the level x for the first time. Because the distribution of this hitting time
is known, we can compute the expected speed with which the utility flow paths u(ct) increase.
More precisely, as we are interested in agent’s discounted expected utility, we can compute the
expected amount of discounted time that u(ct) spends above u¯(x), for any x ≥ y0. Using (14),
we have
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt1[u¯(x),∞)(u(ct))dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
τx
re−rtdt
]
= E[e−rτx ]
=
(y0
x
)κ
,
where 1[a,b)(·) is the indicator function of the interval [a, b), and the last line uses (9). Because
the total amount of the discounted time is normalized to unity, 1 − (y0x )κ is the expected
discounted amount of time that the agent’s utility flow spends below the level u¯(x), for any
x > y0. Therefore,
∫∞
y0
u¯(x)d(1−(y0x )κ) represents the total expected discounted utility delivered
to the agent in the contract. By the construction of the contract, we know that this value equals
Vaut(y0).5
It is also worth pointing out that partial insurance is not a transitory phenomenon in our
model. At any t, the probability of a consumption path increase in the future is strictly positive.
3.2 Continuation value dynamics
Let us now examine the dynamics of the continuation value process vt delivered to the agent
under the contract c in (11). Because consumption cs is determined by ms at all dates s ≥ t,
the knowledge of mt and yt is sufficient to determine the continuation value vt delivered to the
agent. In fact, at all dates and states under the optimal contract (11) we can decompose vt as
follows
vt = E
[∫ τmt
t
re−r(s−t)u¯(mt)ds+ e−r(τmt−t)Vaut(mt)|Ft
]
,
5Taking the limit m→∞ in equation (31) in Appendix A, we can confirm that Vaut(y0) = −
∫∞
y0
u¯(x)d( y
x
)κ,
which means that the contract indeed delivers Vaut(y0).
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where τmt = mins {s ≥ t : ys = mt} is the first time when yt returns to its to-date maximum
mt. From the above we have that
vt = (1− E[e−r(τmt−t)|Ft])u¯(mt) + E[e−r(τmt−t)|Ft]Vaut(mt), (15)
which means that vt is a weighted average of u¯(mt) and Vaut(mt). From (9), we know that
E
[
e−r(τmt−t)|Ft
]
=
(
yt
mt
)κ
.
We thus have that vt = V (yt,mt) where
V (y,m) =
(
1−
( y
m
)κ)
u¯(m) +
( y
m
)κ
Vaut(m), for any m ≥ y > 0. (16)
The sufficiency of the pair (y,m) to determine the continuation allocation (and therefore the
value to the agent and the cost to the principal) is a remarkable feature of the optimal contract.
In particular, when yt = mt, the contract shows what Kocherlakota (1996) and Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004) describe as amnesia: history does not matter, i.e., the continuation contract is
the same for all paths of past income {ys; 0 ≤ s < t}.
Lemma 2 The function V satisfies
(i) 0 < Vy(y,m) ≤ V ′aut(y) with equality only if y = m;
(ii) Vy(y,m) is strictly increasing in y;
(iii) 0 ≤ Vm(y,m) with equality only if y = m.
Proof In Appendix A. 
The above lemma provides a lot of information about the dynamics of the agent’s continu-
ation value process vt under the optimal contract c.
As we have seen in the previous subsection, the optimal contract (11) provides constant
consumption at almost all dates t. However, the continuation value under (11), vt, fluctuates
at all t. This is because the continuation value depends on the distance between yt and mt,
which fluctuates continuously. The larger this distance, the longer the expected waiting time
for the next permanent increase in consumption. Thus, vt is positively correlated with yt at all
times.
This correlation measures the degree of insurance against innovations in income that the
optimal contract provides to the agent. Let us define full insurance against income innovations
at time t as dvt/dyt = 0, no insurance against income innovations at t as dvt/dyt = V ′aut(yt),
and partial insurance as 0 < dvt/dyt < V ′aut(yt).6 Then, the first conclusion in the above lemma
tells us that the optimal contract never provides full insurance, and provides no insurance if and
6Note that the optimal contract under full commitment provides full insurance against the innovations at all
times, while the autarky allocation provides no insurance against innovations at all times.
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only when yt = mt. Thus, at almost all times, the contract provides partial insurance against
income innovations.
The partial insurance property is intuitive. When a negative innovation in yt occurs (i.e., yt
goes down), vt suffers because the expected waiting time until the next permanent consumption
hike (i.e., when yt+s achieves yt + ε) lengthens. So vt responds negatively to drops in yt. But
upon any such drop in yt, Vaut(yt) suffers even more because not only the same waiting time
lengthens (i.e., when Vaut(yt+s) climbs up to Vaut(yt + ε)) but also temporary consumption
drops, as ct = yt under autarky, while it does not drop under the optimal contract allocation c
in (11).
This difference between the responses of vt and Vaut(yt) to the innovations in yt shrinks as
yt closes on mt, because the expected duration of smoothed consumption under the optimal
contract decreases as yt approaches mt. Thus, as the second property in the above lemma
demonstrates, the degree of insurance is monotone in the distance between mt and yt. The
farther away yt is from its to-date maximummt, the smaller the effect of an income innovation on
the expected time until the next consumption hike, and so the more stable the continuation value
under the optimal contract. Therefore, the farther away from the boundary of consumption
adjustment an innovation in income takes place, the more fully it is insured.
The third property in Lemma 2, Vm ≥ 0, is intuitive. Fix some two paths of past income
{y1s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t} and {y2s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t} such that y1t = y2t but m1t > m2t . Consider the continuation
value vit that the optimal contract delivers to the agent under past income history {yis; 0 ≤ s ≤ t}
for i = 1, 2. Because u¯ is strictly increasing, we have u(c1t ) = u¯(m
1
t ) > u¯(m
2
t ) = u(c
2
t ), i.e.,
the agent’s utility flow at t is larger under the income history {y1s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. The same
remains true at all dates s ∈ [t, τm1t ), i.e., as long as the state ms remains below m1t . At date
τm1t , however, the continuation value of the agent will be the same, Vaut(m
1
t ), independently of
the past income history (amnesia). Thus, with the income history {y1s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, the agent
receives a higher utility flow relative to the income history {y2s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t} during the time
interval [t, τm1t ), and the same continuation value from time τm1t onward along every income
path.7 Thus, v1t > v
2
t , which means that, keeping current income yt fixed, the continuation
value delivered to the agent by the optimal contract is strictly increasing in mt.
Finally, it follows as a simple corollary of Lemma 2 that the contract defined in (11) is
enforceable (sustainable), i.e., that vt ≥ Vaut(yt) at all dates and states. In fact, we have
directly from our construction of the contract that if yt = mt, then vt = V (yt, yt) = Vaut(yt).
For yt < mt, Lemma 2(iii) implies that V (yt,mt) > V (yt, yt), and so vt > Vaut(yt).
3.3 Optimal contract when V¯ > Vaut(y0)
When V¯ > Vaut(y0), we can obtain the optimal contract from continuation of the optimal
contract that starts at V¯ = Vaut(y0), as this continuation must be optimal (for otherwise the
contract c would not be optimal in the first place). For this case, it is enough to modify the
7Also, the expectation over continuation paths is the same under both past income histories because y1t = y
2
t
and income is a Markov process.
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initial condition of the state variable. Let m¯0 be defined by
V (y0, m¯0) = V¯ .
Because, by Lemma 2, V (y,m) is strictly increasing in m, a unique solution m¯0 to the above
equation exists for any V¯ ≥ Vaut(y0). At any t ≥ 0, let the agent’s consumption be given by
ct = u−1(u¯(m¯t)), (17)
where m¯t = max{mt, m¯0}. Note in particular that when V¯ = Vaut(y0), we have m¯0 = y0.
For any y, let us denote the inverse of V (y, ·) by M(y, ·). In this notation, m¯0 = M(y0, V¯ )
and for any pair (y0, V¯ ) the optimal contract is given by ct = u−1(u¯(max{mt,M(y0, V¯ )})). Our
heuristic derivation makes it clear that this contract is indeed optimal for any pair (y0, V¯ ). We
formally verify this in subsection 3.5.
3.4 Cost to the principal
In this subsection, we study the properties of the principal’s continuation cost under the
contract c in (11), expressed as a function of the state (yt, m¯t). Denoting the principal’s con-
tinuation cost process by Zt, we have that, at all t, Zt = Z(yt, m¯t), where
Z(y,m) =
(
1−
( y
m
)κ)
u−1(u¯(m)) +
( y
m
)κ ∫ ∞
m
u−1(u¯(x))d
(
1−
(m
x
)κ)− rP (y). (18)
The first term on the right-hand side of this expression represents the expected present value
of the constant consumption flow the agent receives for as long as his income does not exceed
m. The second term is the expected present value of consumption delivered to the agent from
the moment his income hits m onward.8 The third term, rP (y) = ry/(r − µ), is the present
value of the agent’s future income (in flow units).
This expression allows us to study the properties of the process Zt through the properties
of the function Z.
Lemma 3 The function Z satisfies:
(i) Zy(y,m) > − rr−µ and is strictly increasing in y with limy→0 Zy(y,m) = − rr−µ ;
(ii) Zm(y,m) ≥ 0, with equality only if y = m;
(iii) For a given m, if dZ(y,y)dy |y=m ≤ 0, then Zy(y,m) ≤ 0 for all y ≤ m.
Proof In Appendix A. 
Recall that in the case of full commitment, under optimal contract, the agent’s consumption
is constant. The principal’s cost to deliver a continuation value v to an agent with current
income y is given by
Cf (y, v) = u−1(v)− rP (y), (19)
8Recall that when y = m, then 1− (m
x
)κ is the expected discounted time that the agent’s consumption flow
spends below the level u−1(u¯(x)) for x ≥ m.
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where u−1(v) is the constant consumption level needed to deliver promised utility v. We see
that, under full commitment, the present value of the agent’s future consumption, u−1(v), is
always constant. Because
Cfy (y, v) = −rP ′(y)
= − r
r − µ,
the principal’s cost negatively co-varies one-for-one with the present value of the agent’s future
income.
In the one-sided commitment case, Lemma 3(i) shows that the principal’s cost does not
respond as strongly to the changes in income as it does under full commitment. This is because
the present value of the agent’s future consumption is not constant under one-sided commitment.
In fact, it is strictly increasing in current income. Thus, when y increases, the drop in the
principal’s continuation cost that is due to the increase in P (y) is offset by an increase in the
present value of the agent’s future consumption.
In general, this offsetting effect can be strong enough to cause the overall cost to increase
when income increases. Intuitively, this can happen if the agent’s utility function approaches
risk neutrality at high consumption levels. When income is low, the agent is risk averse, and
the principal’s profit is high. But when income is high, the agent is almost risk neutral, thus the
principal’s profit can be lower. Part (iii) of Lemma 3 provides a sufficient condition for this not
to be the case (the principal’s profit is increasing in agent’s income when dZ(y, y)/dy|y=m ≤ 0).
It is easy to check that this sufficient condition is met when the agent’s preferences satisfy
CRRA (see also the Example below).
Part (ii) of Lemma 3 has a simple intuition. Since higher promised utility to the agent
incurs more cost to the principal, Zm ≥ 0 follows directly from Vm ≥ 0.
The total surplus from the relationship between the principal and the agent can be defined
as −C(y, Vaut(y))/r. This quantity represents the amount of profit (measured as a stock)
that the principal can generate by efficiently providing to the agent whose income is y the
autarky value Vaut(y). Under the optimal contract, we have C(y, Vaut(y)) = Z(y, y). Since the
autarkic contract (i.e., ct = yt for all t) generates zero surplus, the surplus from the optimal
contract, which is different from autarky under agent risk aversion, is strictly positive. Thus,
−Z(y, y)/r > 0 for all y.
Example (continued) If utility is logarithmic, u(c) = log(c), then, after substituting ct =
mt exp
(−κσ2/(2r)) in (18) and simplifying, we get
Z(y,m) = m exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)(
1 +
1
κ− 1
( y
m
)κ)− y r
r − µ. (20)
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The total contract surplus is given by
−Z(y, y)
r
= −
(
y exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)(
1 +
1
κ− 1
)
1
r
− y 1
r − µ
)
= −
(
exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)(
1 +
κσ2
2r
)
− 1
)
1
r − µy,
where the second line uses (13). Let
ψ = exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)(
1 +
κσ2
2r
)
. (21)
Because exp(x) > 1 + x for any x > 0, we have 0 < ψ < 1. We can now write
−Z(y, y)
r
= (1− ψ) 1
r − µy, (22)
which shows that the total contract surplus is strictly positive and proportional to y. Equiv-
alently, the total contract surplus is a constant fraction of the agent’s human wealth P (y) =
y/(r−µ). Similar calculations show that the same is true for any CRRA utility function. Also,
one can show that with CRRA preferences the contract surplus is strictly increasing in the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
3.5 Formal verification of optimality
Our heuristic derivation of the optimal contract c in (11) contains the intuition for why
it in fact is optimal. Because the principal is risk-neutral, it is efficient to provide the agent
with full insurance. Permanent full insurance, however, is not feasible, because of the agent’s
participation constraints. The contract c in (11) is a minimal deviation from permanent full
insurance that satisfies the participation constraints. This heuristic argument must, however,
be verified formally. That is, we need to show that the principal’s cost under this contract, i.e.,
Z(y0,M(y0, V¯ )), in fact equals the minimum cost C(y0, V¯ ) of providing the agent whose initial
income level is y0 with utility V¯ . We provide this formal verification argument in Appendix B.
4 Implementation
In this section, we show that the optimal contract can be implemented in an arrangement in
which the principal, instead of offering a long-term contract that swaps the income process y for
a consumption process c, offers to the agent a pair of trading accounts: a simple bank account
with a credit line and a hedging account in which the agent can take out insurance against his
income risk. The final allocation is then determined by the agent through his trading activity in
the two accounts. This mechanism is significantly less restrictive than the “direct” mechanism
in which the principal controls the agent’s consumption directly. The agent has much more
control over his consumption than under the direct long-term swap contract. Yet, we show that
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under an appropriate choice of the initial bank account balance and the credit line process, the
final allocation is the same as the optimum c.
The trading mechanism we consider here is closely related to the one that agents face in
the complete-markets economy with solvency constraints of Alvarez and Jermann (2000).9 The
partial-equilibrium implementation result that we present is a restricted version of the general-
equilibrium decentralization result obtained in Alvarez and Jermann (2000). Tractability is an
advantage of our continuous-time model. We are able to characterize the solvency constraints
in detail. In particular, we show that they take in our model a simple form of a borrowing
constraint. Also, we show in our model that although the agent’s total (that is, financial and
human) wealth is positively correlated with income, the correlation between the agent’s financial
wealth and his income is negative.
We start this section by studying the implementation of the optimal allocation under the
assumption of full commitment. The borrowing constraint turns out to be the only difference
between the implementing mechanisms in the full-commitment environment and the one-sided
commitment model. In this implementation, therefore, the borrowing constraint is the impli-
cation of the limited-commitment friction.
4.1 The agent’s problem
The principal offers the agent two accounts: a simple bank account with a credit line and
a hedging account in which the agent can hedge his income risk at fair odds. The interest rate
in the bank account is equal to the common rate of time preference. We will show that under
an appropriate choice of the credit line, this trading mechanism is optimal. By optimality we
mean that the agent trading freely in these two accounts will choose individually the same con-
sumption process as that provided by the optimal contract, and thus will achieve the maximum
utility at the minimum cost to the principal.
Let At denote the agent’s bank account balance process. The asset At is risk-free and pays
a net interest r. The principal imposes a lower bound process Bt ≤ 0 on the agent’s bank
account balance, i.e., At must satisfy
At ≥ Bt, at all t. (23)
Because Bt ≤ 0, the quantity Bt represents the size of the credit line that the principal makes
available to the agent within the bank account.
The fair-odds hedging account works as follows. The agent chooses a hedging position
at all t. If the agent’s hedging position is βt at t, then at time t + dt, the hedging account
pays off βt(wt+dt − wt) to the agent. Thus, the agent can use this account to hedge (bet
against) the innovations dwt to his income process. The payoff flow to the agent can be positive
or negative, but its expected value is zero for any choice of the hedging position process βt
9See also Krueger and Perri (2006) and Krueger and Uhlig (2006). Albanesi and Sleet (2006) consider a
similar implementation in an economy with full enforcement, private information, and taxes.
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because E[βtdwt] = E[βt(wt+dt − wt)] = 0. Thus, the fair-odds price of the hedging asset is
zero.10
The agent chooses his consumption process ct, his bank account balance process At, and his
hedging position process βt subject to the credit limit (23) and the flow budget constraint
dAt = (rAt + yt − ct)dt+ βtdwt, at all t. (24)
The agent’s objective is to maximize the utility of consumption. We will refer to any utility-
maximizing trading strategy as an equilibrium of the two-account problem.
4.2 Implementation of the full-commitment optimum
In this subsection, we discuss how this two-account trading mechanism could, under the
conditions of full commitment, be used to implement the optimal allocation from the full-
commitment long-term contracting problem.
Recall that the optimal allocation under full commitment provides full insurance to the
agent with a constant consumption process ct = u−1(V¯ ) at all dates and states. Thus, the
agent’s continuation value process is constant vt = V¯ , and the principal’s cost function is
Cf (y0, V¯ ) = u−1(V¯ )− rP (y0).
Suppose now that the principal offers the two trading accounts to the agent with some initial
bank account balance A0 and some credit limit process Bt. The objective of the principal is
to choose these conditions in such a way as to deliver to the agent lifetime utility V¯ at the
minimum cost Cf (y0, V¯ ).
Proposition 1 Suppose the principal offers the initial balance
A0 =
Cf (y0, V¯ )
r
and no borrowing limit except for the requirement that limt→∞E[e−rtAt] ≥ 0. Then,
ct = u−1(V¯ ),
At =
Cf (yt, V¯ )
r
,
βt = − σyt
r − µ (25)
are an optimal consumption and trading strategy for the agent.
10We could alternatively formulate the hedging account in terms of payoffs contingent on the innovations dyt,
instead of dwt. Because the income process y is not a martingale (unless µ = 0), in the alternative formulation
the principal would have to charge the agent a premium flow of E[βtdyt] = βtµytdt so as to break even. The
formulation we adopt is simpler because E[βtdwt] = 0 for any βt, and so the fair-odds premium is zero. These
two formulations are otherwise equivalent: the properties of the optimal credit limit and agent’s equilibrium
consumption, wealth, and hedging ratio processes are the same in both cases.
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Proof In Appendix A. 
Note that the borrowing constraint here is as loose as possible. All that the principal requires
is that the agent does not play a Ponzi scheme on the principal. The borrowing constraint could
be tighter, as long as it is never binding. For example, it could be Bt = Cf (yt, V¯ )/r, in which
case At = Bt at all t but the constraint never binds.
Recall that the cost function Cf given in (19) can be written as Cf (y, v) = u−1(v)− rP (y),
where P (y) is agent’s human wealth given in (2). In the above implementation of the full-
insurance allocation, the agent’s bank account balance process is At = Cf (yt, V¯ )/r. We thus
have that
At + P (yt) =
u−1(V¯ )
r
, at all t.
This means that the agent’s total wealth—the sum of his financial wealth At and his human
wealth P (yt)—is constant at all dates and states. All shocks to the agent’s human wealth are
perfectly absorbed by his financial wealth, i.e., dP (yt) = −dAt at all dates and states. In
particular, the agent takes out in equilibrium a hedging position βt that perfectly offsets the
innovations to his human wealth. In fact, by Ito’s lemma,
dP (yt) =
1
r − µµytdt+
1
r − µσytdwt,
and so the innovations to P (yt) are represented by 1r−µσytdwt. By (25), these innovations are
equal to −βtdwt. Thus, the agent is fully hedged at all dates and states.
We can see here that access to hedging is necessary for implementation of the optimum.
If instead the agent had access to the bank account only, similar to the standard incomplete-
markets model, then his flow budget constraint would be
dAt = (rAt − ct + yt)dt. (26)
In this case, the total wealth At + P (yt) could not be constant because dP (yt) contains a
volatility term while dAt does not. Thus, since the present value of future consumption must
equal the agent’s total wealth, consumption cannot be perfectly smoothed without the hedging
account.
We also see that the role of the bank account here, where the agent has access to full hedging
opportunities, is much different from what it would be in the incomplete-markets setting, in
which no hedging is available to the agent, i.e., the agent uses his bank account to self-insure
his income shocks. In particular, with hedging available to him, the agent has no precautionary
motive for saving. As a result, his financial wealth At co-varies negatively with human wealth
P (yt), and thus also with the current income yt.
4.3 Implementation of the one-sided optimum
In this section, we return to the case of one-sided commitment, in which the agent can stop
participating (default) at any time. At any point in time, thus, the agent can permanently
exit the contract and stay in autarky forever. If he does, he loses the credit line and access to
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hedging with the principal, but can consume his own income {yt+s; s ≥ 0} without having to
repay his debt −At, if any, to the principal.
We show that the optimal consumption process ct given in (11), combined with some trading
strategy {βt; t ≥ 0} and asset level process {At; t ≥ 0} solve the agent’s utility maximization
problem.
Proposition 2 Suppose the borrowing constraint is given by
Bt =
C(yt, Vaut(yt))
r
, (27)
and the agent’s initial assets are
A0 =
C(y0, V¯ )
r
. (28)
Then, under the above trading mechanism, the agent’s optimal consumption and trading strategy
are as follows:
ct = u−1(u¯(m¯t)),
At =
Z(yt, m¯t)
r
,
βt =
Zy(yt, m¯t)σyt
r
,
where m¯t = max{max0≤s≤t yt, m¯0}, u¯ is given in (12), Z is given in (18), and m¯0 = M(y0, V¯ ).
Proof In Appendix A. 
The credit limit in (27) is not just a no-Ponzi condition that we had in the case of the
full-commitment implementation. It is now a binding constraint analogous to the solvency
constraints of Alvarez and Jermann (2000). In our model, these constraints can be succinctly
characterized by a single function of current income alone. (Note that Bt = B(yt), where
B(y) = C(y, Vaut(y))/r.) Thus, in our continuous-time model, the state-contingent solvency
constraints of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) take the simple form of a borrowing constraint
that depends only on current income. Our framework allows for a clear characterization of
this borrowing constraint. In fact, we see from (27) that, at any t, the agent’s credit limit
(the negative of the borrowing constraint value) equals the total surplus from the relationship
between the principal and the agent. The initial asset level (28) determines how this surplus
is divided between the principal and the agent. If A0 = B0, the whole surplus goes to the
principal. If A0 = 0, the whole surplus goes to the agent.
We now discuss the main properties of the agent’s optimal trading strategy in this imple-
mentation.
Total wealth When income yt fluctuates below m¯t, the agent, similar to the case of full-
insurance allocation under full commitment, stabilizes his current consumption. However, unlike
in the full insurance case, the present value of the agent’s future consumption is not stabilized.
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Under both full- and one-sided commitment, the present value of future consumption is iden-
tically equal to the agent’s total wealth Wt = At + P (yt). Stabilization of the present value
of future consumption, thus, is equivalent to stabilization of the agent’s total wealth, which
was the case in the full-commitment optimum, and is not the case in the limited-commitment
optimum. Formally, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 At all t, the agent’s total wealth Wt is strictly positively correlated with yt.
Proof In Appendix A. 
Financial wealth and the buffer stock When income yt fluctuates below m¯t, the agent’s
bank account balance At remains strictly above the credit limit Bt. When yt hits m¯t, the
bank account balance At reaches the credit limit Bt. This can happen in one of two ways.
If Zy(y,m) ≤ 0 for all y ≤ m, which is true under, e.g., CRRA preferences, the correlation
between income yt and bank account balance At is always negative. As yt approaches m¯t from
below, the bank account balance At approaches Bt from above, and hits it when yt hits m¯t. If
Zy(y,m) > 0 for y close to m, the correlation between yt and the bank account balance At is
positive at yt close to m¯t. When yt hits m¯t, the credit limit is reached, i.e., At = Bt. This,
however, is achieved not by At dropping down to Bt, because At increases when yt increases
as it reaches m¯t. Rather, Bt increases with yt faster than At does and, as a result, Bt hits At
from below to achieve At = Bt. In either case, the buffer stock of assets held by the agent,
St = At −Bt, is negatively correlated with income yt, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 At all t, the agent’s buffer stock St = At − Bt is negatively correlated with income
yt. This correlation is zero if and only if St = 0.
Proof In Appendix A. 
The negative correlation between financial wealth and income is intuitive in a setting in
which shocks to the present value of lifetime income are at least partially insured. Take disability
as an example of such a shock. When an agent becomes disabled, his human wealth drops
drastically. The value of her disability insurance policy soars, however, as now this policy is “in
the money.” With disability insurance in place, therefore, the occurrence of disability decreases
human wealth and increases financial wealth.
The above lemma clearly shows the difference between the role that financial wealth fulfills
in our model, in which the agent can hedge, and the role it fulfills in the self-insurance models,
in which agents do not have access to hedging. Under self-insurance, which takes place, e.g.,
in Bewley-type incomplete-markets models, the financial wealth’s function is to buffer off the
income shocks. Financial wealth is accumulated when income increases and decumulated when
income decreases. The buffer stock of financial assets is thus positively correlated with income
in these models. In our model, which is a version of the complete-markets model of Alvarez
and Jermann (2000), the agent can obtain insurance via hedging. The role of financial wealth
is not to buffer off the income shocks but rather to buffer off the losses from hedging the
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shocks to current income (and thus also the human wealth). Hedging generates losses precisely
when current income increases. Thus, the financial buffer stock decreases when current income
increases. In effect, the correlation between current income and the financial buffer stock is
negative in our model.
The negative correlation between the financial buffer stock (or, more directly, assets in the
natural case of Zy(y,m) ≤ 0) implies that the degree of consumption insurance provided to
the agent in the complete-markets model with borrowing constraints we consider here is larger
than that provided to the agent in the standard incomplete-markets model, in the following
sense. In both models, the expected present value of the agent’s future consumption is equal
to his total wealth Wt, and total wealth is the sum of human wealth and financial wealth:
Wt = P (yt) +At, at all t. For a small dt > 0, denote the change in the total wealth process Wt
by dWt = Wt+dt −Wt, with similar notation for the corresponding changes in At and P (yt).
Because of the identity between total wealth and the sum of human and financial wealth, we
have that
covt(dWt, dP (yt)) = vart(dP (yt)) + covt(dAt, dP (yt)),
i.e., the conditional covariance between the change of the present value of future consumption
and the change of human wealth equals the sum of the conditional variance of the change
in human wealth and the conditional covariance between the changes in financial and human
wealth. In our complete-markets model, the covariance between the change in present value
of future consumption and the change in human wealth, covt(dWt, dP (yt)), is smaller than the
variance of the change of human wealth precisely because covt(dAt, dP (yt)) < 0 at all t.11 With
incomplete markets, the covariance between the change of the present value of consumption and
the change in human wealth is equal to the variance of the change in human wealth because
covt(dAt, dP (yt)) is zero in that model.12
In the full-commitment case, as we have seen in the previous subsection, the agent did not
face a limit on how low his financial wealth could become along any realization of the income
path. In the one-sided commitment case, the agent faces the constraint St ≥ 0. The next
lemma describes the dynamics of the buffer stock as it hits its lower bound.
Lemma 6 When St = 0, the volatility of St is zero and the drift of St is strictly positive.
Proof In Appendix A. 
Because the buffer stock St remains non-negative at all t, it is clear that its volatility must
be zero when St = 0, for otherwise St would become strictly negative with probability one.
11In particular, as we have seen in the previous subsection, in the case of full-commitment there are no
borrowing constraints and, in effect, the covariance between the changes in the present value of consumption and
human wealth is brought down all the way to zero, i.e., covt(dWt, dP (yt)) = 0.
12Clearly, covt(dAt, dP (yt)) is zero also under the autarkic allocation, as financial wealth is identically zero
in autarky. This covariance is thus the same in the incomplete-markets model and in autarky. The incomplete-
markets model, however, delivers some consumption smoothing through self-insurance. To see this, note that
Et[dAtdP (yt)] is negative in a typical incomplete-markets model, while zero in autarky.
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That the drift of St at zero is strictly positive means that zero is not an absorbing barrier for
St, but rather is reflective.
Outside of the special case in which Zy(y, m¯)|y=m¯ = 0, the volatility of the agent’s finan-
cial wealth is non-zero even when the agent reaches his credit limit. This fact highlights some
important properties of the optimal allocation. Recall from Section 3 that the agent’s contin-
uation value vt is equal to his autarky value Vaut(yt) when yt = m¯t, which is a consequence of
the binding participation constraint at times t such that yt = m¯t. As we see in Lemma 2(i),
locally at these time points, the principal provides no insurance against the agent’s income
innovations, so the agent’s continuation value locally behaves as if the agent were in autarky.
But the optimal contract supports these local properties of the continuation value process with
an allocation that is very different from autarky (and more efficient). This fact is easy to see
through the properties of the implementing mechanism. In autarky, agent’s financial wealth
is identically equal to zero, and thus so is its volatility. In the above implementation of the
optimal allocation, this volatility is generically non-zero even when yt = m¯t, which makes it
clear that the optimal allocation is not similar to autarky even locally at times when the agent’s
continuation value is. Also, the non-zero volatility of financial wealth at yt = m¯t shows that
the optimal allocation is not locally the same as the optimal self-insurance allocation, because
under self-insurance the agent’s financial wealth’s volatility would be zero (cf. (26)).
Hedging Recall that the hedging position βt represents the sensitivity of the agent’s finan-
cial wealth At to shocks dwt, and the corresponding sensitivity of the human wealth P (yt) is
represented by ytσ/(r − µ). Let us thus define the agent’s hedging ratio hAt as
hAt =
−βt
ytσ
r−µ
.
As shown in the previous subsection, under full commitment the agent’s hedging ratio equals
one at all dates and states. In this way, agent’s total wealth Wt is stabilized. Thus, hAt = 1
defines full hedging. In the limited-commitment optimum, the hedging ratio hAt is strictly less
than one at all t. This reflects the result of Lemma 4, i.e., that financial wealth At does not
respond to shocks dwt as strongly as human wealth P (yt) does. In effect, the agent’s total
wealth Wt is positively correlated with current income yt. For a fixed m¯t, the agent’s hedging
ratio is decreasing in yt. When income is very low (yt is close to zero), the hedging ratio is
close to one, i.e., the agent is nearly fully hedged. When yt increases, the hedging ratio drops.
The closer current income yt approaches m¯t, the less hedged the agent becomes. Let us also
define the (implicit) hedging ratio hBt that characterizes the borrowing limit process Bt as the
negative of the volatility of Bt divided by the volatility of human wealth P (yt). The agent’s
hedging ratio hAt is bounded below by h
B
t . These results are summed up in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 At all t, the hedging ratio hAt satisfies
hBt ≤ hAt < 1,
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with equality if and only if yt = m¯t. Also, hAt is decreasing in yt and approaches one as yt
approaches zero.
Proof In Appendix A. 
Example (continued) With log utility, using (20) we obtain
βt =
(
1
r
exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)
κ
κ− 1
(
yt
m¯t
)κ−1
− 1
r − µ
)
σyt,
and so the agent’s hedging ratio is given by
hAt = 1−
r − µ
r
exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)
κ
κ− 1
(
yt
m¯t
)κ−1
= 1− ψ
(
yt
m¯t
)κ−1
,
where ψ ∈ (0, 1) is given in (21). For a fixed m, this hedging ratio is strictly decreasing in
y and approaching one (full hedging) from below as y → 0. When m = y, the hedging ratio
reduces to 1−ψ, i.e., is a strictly positive constant, the same for all y. This constant is a lower
bound on the hedging ratio. Whenever y < m, the hedging ratio is strictly larger than this
lower bound. Similar calculations show that the same is true for any CRRA utility function.
When the agent’s preferences do not exhibit CRRA, the lower bound on the hedging ratio will
generally depend on y.
Turning to the credit limit process Bt, using (22), we have Bt = B(yt) where B(y) is given
by
B(y) =
Z(y, y)
r
= −1− ψ
r − µy.
The dynamics of Bt, therefore, are
dBt = −1− ψ
r − µdyt = −
1− ψ
r − µµytdt−
1− ψ
r − µσytdwt.
Comparing this to the dynamics of At we have
−1− ψ
r − µσyt =
(
exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)
κ
κ− 1
1
r
− 1
r − µ
)
σyt
>
(
exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)
κ
κ− 1
1
r
(
yt
m¯t
)κ−1
− 1
r − µ
)
σyt
= βt,
i.e., the volatility of Bt is less negative than the volatility of At, for yt < m¯t strictly. The
hedging ratio of the credit limit hBt is equal to the lower bound on the agent’s hedging ratio,
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i.e., hBt = 1−ψ. We can also directly see in this example that the volatility of the buffer stock
St = At −Bt, given by (
1−
(
yt
m¯t
)κ−1)
exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)
κ
κ− 1
1
r
σyt,
is zero when At = Bt, i.e., when yt = m¯t.
The drift of At is
rAt + yt − ct = Zt + yt − exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)
mt,
which, using (20), is equal to
m¯t exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)
1
κ− 1
(
yt
m¯t
)κ
− yt µ
r − µ.
Subtracting the drift of Bt and simplifying, we get that the drift of the buffer stock St is
yt exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)
κ
κ− 1
[
1
κ
(
yt
m¯t
)κ−1
− µ
r
]
.
This formula shows explicitly that when St = 0, the drift of the buffer stock is strictly positive,
as 1κ − µr = (κ−1)σ
2
2r > 0, which follows from (13). 
4.4 Other credit limit processes
In general, the credit limit process Bt given in (27) is not unique. In the class of fully
history-dependent processes, it could be replaced with a tighter or looser credit limit process.
For instance, any process B˜t such that C(yt, Vaut(m¯t))/r ≥ B˜t ≥ Bt would preserve the im-
plementation result. In particular, one could take B˜t = C(yt, Vaut(m¯t))/r. In this case, the
agent’s assets would always sit on the credit limit. Essentially, however, the impact of the limit
process B˜t would be the same as that of the process Bt, as the agent’s optimal trading and
consumption strategy is the same.
The credit limit process Bt in (27) depends only on the agent’s current income, i.e., Bt =
B(yt), where B(yt) = C(yt, Vaut(yt))/r. In particular, Bt is independent of the current asset
position At, or the the history of past income. It turns out that this credit limit is the unique
optimal credit limit process in the class of process Bt that can be given as a continuous function
of yt. This means that any relaxation of the borrowing constraint function B(·) would allow
the agent to modify his strategy, default, and obtain higher utility while leaving the principal
with an inefficiently high cost, which would invalidate the implementation result; while any
tightening of the borrowing constraint function B(·) would restrict the budget set of the agent
more than necessary to satisfy the participation constraints, which would lead to a loss of
efficiency.
Lemma 8 Let Bt be an optimal credit limit process. If Bt = B(yt) for some continuous function
B(·), then B(y) = C(y, Vaut(y))/r.
Proof In Appendix A. 
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5 Extensions
As we show in (11), the optimal consumption process in our model is given as a fixed,
increasing function of the to-date maximal income. This property of the optimal contract is
not specific to our continuous-time model with geometric Brownian motion income process.
In Appendix C, we show how our analytical characterization in (11) can be extended to a
class of discrete-time models in which the agent’s income process is a first-order Markov chain
whose transition matrix satisfies a weak first-order stochastic dominance condition. As well,
this characterization extends to other continuous-time models. In particular, it holds for any
continuous-path income process under which the derivative of E[e−rτε ] is continuous at zero.
As long as this condition holds, the certainty equivalent utility flow rate, u¯(y0), can be ap-
proximated by the certainty equivalents from relaxed problems, u¯ε(y0), and our method of
characterizing the optimal contract remains valid.13
In those more general models, even though the optimal contract can be characterized as in
(11) and implemented in a trading mechanism with some form of Alvarez-Jermann solvency
constraints, the properties of the optimal allocation and the implementing equilibrium analogous
to those we discuss in lemmas 2 to 7 would be much more difficult to obtain and present. For
this reason, we study in this paper the optimal risk-sharing problem with one-sided commitment
in a continuous-time model with a geometric Brownian motion structure for the income process.
In our implementation, as long as the borrowing constraints are enforced, there is no restric-
tion on hedging, i.e., the agent can choose the process {βt; t ≥ 0} with no size restrictions. This
critically depends on the continuity of the time paths of the bank balance process {At; t ≥ 0}.
In contrast, in a discrete-time model, state-contingent solvency constraints necessarily imply a
restriction on the agent’s hedging position at all times. Without such a restriction, the agent
could take out a hedging position that would pay off enormous amounts in some states of nature
and require delivery of enormous amounts in other states. The agent could use this extreme
gambling strategy to obtain a profitable deviation from the desired equilibrium strategy, thus in-
validating the implementation result. In this deviation, which is often called a double-deviation
strategy, the agent combines the extreme gamble against a subset of the possible states of
nature with default in the states in which his gamble does not pay off. The upside value of
this plan can be made very large while the downside risk is bounded by the value of autarky
that the agent obtains when he defaults. This makes the double-deviation strategy profitable.
In our model, double deviations cannot provide a large upside potential to the agent because
income sample paths are continuous. Intuitively, this means that in our model, in which the
income shocks are small (and frequent), the agent cannot take a hedging position large enough
to obtain a large gamble, which is necessary to make the double-deviation plan profitable.
Equivalently, the agent cannot generate a discontinuous time path for his bank account bal-
ance, which means he cannot violate his borrowing constraint by a meaningful amount. The
continuous time path property of the income process is important here. In a continuous-time
13For example, if the log of the income process is an Ornstein-Unlenbeck mean-reverting process, the formula
for the derivative of E[e−rτε ] can be obtained from Borodin and Salminen (2002, page 524, formula 2.0.1).
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model with discontinuous income paths (for example, with discrete income shocks arriving as
a Poisson process), individual shocks could be large (at points of time path discontinuity) and
gambles with large upside potential are possible. As a result, asset paths could have discrete
jumps. In such environments, restrictions on the size of hedging would again become necessary.
In addition, our results can be easily extended to the case of unequal time preference rates
between the principal and the agent. If the principal is more patient than the agent, the
agent’s consumption path drifts down deterministically when participation constraints are not
binding and increases when participation constraints bind. Thus the optimal consumption
path is non-monotonic, and the stationary distribution of consumption may be non-degenerate.
Non-monotonic consumption paths also arise in optimal risk-sharing problems with multi-sided
commitment frictions. We conjecture that our method of characterizing the optimal contract
and its implementation, which we provide in this paper for a continuous-time model with one-
sided commitment, can be extended to study optimal contracts in continuous-time models of
optimal risk-sharing with multi-sided commitment frictions.
6 Conclusion
It has long been recognized in the literature that borrowing constraints are an important tool
to mitigate the risk of borrower default. Existing models, however, deliver optimal borrowing
constraints in the form of complicated restrictions on portfolios of state-contingent assets. Our
model shows how simple borrowing constraints—literally, limits on the amount that an agent
can borrow—emerge as the implication of limited borrower commitment in a continuous-time
model of optimal risk sharing.
Our model is highly tractable. We show how optimal allocation can be expressed as a fixed
function of a single state variable. In the implementation, the optimal credit limit is simply
equal to the total value of the surplus generated by the relationship between the principal and
the agent. We closely characterize the dynamics of wealth and the hedging position held by
the agent. Financial wealth is negatively correlated with current income and with the degree
of hedging. Because of persistence in the income process, a negative shock to current income
decreases the agent’s human wealth. Because of hedging, it increases the agent’s financial
wealth. With more financial wealth, the risk of the agent’s default decreases, so the agent can
better hedge subsequent shocks to his income and human wealth. Our model shows clearly that
the role of financial wealth is drastically different in complete- and incomplete-markets models.
With incomplete markets, financial assets buffer off income shocks. With complete markets,
financial assets buffer off losses generated by the agent’s optimal hedging position, although
not completely, due to the risk of default.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
We begin by noting that the autarky value function Vaut can be expressed as
Vaut(y0) =
∫ ∞
0
u(y)f(y0, y)dy, (29)
where f(y0, y) is the density of the expected discounted amount of time that the income process
starting from y0 spends at each level y ∈ (0,∞). From Borodin and Salminen (2002, page 132),
we know that
f(y0, y) =

r
σ2κ+α
1
y
(
y0
y
)κ
for y ≥ y0,
r
σ2κ+α
1
y
(
y
y0
)κ+2ασ−2
for y ≤ y0,
where κ is the constant given in (10). Differentiating (29) yields
V ′aut(y0) =
r
α+ κσ2
[
κyκ−10
∫ ∞
y0
u(y)y−κ−1dy + (−κ− 2ασ−2)y−κ−2ασ−2−10
∫ y0
0
u(y)yκ+2ασ
−2−1dy
]
.
Then
u¯(y0) = Vaut(y0)− y0
κ
V ′aut(y0)
=
r
α+ κσ2
[
yκ0
∫ ∞
y0
u(y)y−κ−1dy + y−κ−2ασ
−2
0
∫ y0
0
u(y)yκ+2ασ
−2−1dy
−yκ0
∫ ∞
y0
u(y)y−κ−1dy +
κ+ 2ασ−2
κ
y−κ−2ασ
−2
0
∫ y0
0
u(y)yκ+2ασ
−2−1dy
]
=
2r
κσ2
y−κ−2ασ
−2
0
∫ y0
0
u(y)yκ+2ασ
−2−1dy
=
1
κ+ 2α/σ2
y−κ−2ασ
−2
0
∫ y0
0
u(y)yκ+2ασ
−2−1dy
=
∫ y0
0
u(y)d
(
y
y0
)κ+2ασ−2
.
Because u is strictly increasing, it follows that u¯ is a strictly increasing function and that
u¯(y0) < u(y0) for all y0. 
Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Directly from (12), we have that u¯(y) < Vaut(y) at all y because κ > 0. We can thus see
in (16) that V is strictly increasing in y because the weight on the larger value Vaut(m)
is strictly increasing in y. Indeed, taking the partial derivative in (16), we have
Vy(y,m) = κyκ−1m−κ(Vaut(m)− u¯(m)) > 0.
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To see that Vy(y,m) ≤ V ′aut(y), first note (16) can be written as
V (y,m) = −
∫ m
y
u¯(m)d
(y
x
)κ
+
( y
m
)κ
Vaut(m), (30)
because 1 − ( ym)κ = −
∫m
y d(
y
x)
κ. Note also that definition of u¯(·) allows us to express
Vaut(y) as
Vaut(y) = −
∫ m
y
u¯(x)d
(y
x
)κ
+
( y
m
)κ
Vaut(m), for any m ≥ y > 0. (31)
To see this, note that this equation holds trivially for m = y and the derivative of the
right-hand side with respect to m
κyκm−κ−1u¯(m)− κyκm−κ−1Vaut(m) +
( y
m
)κ
V ′aut(m)
is zero because u¯(m) = Vaut(m)− κ−1mV ′aut(m). Thus, the right-hand side is constant in
m. From (30) and (31) we have
V (y,m)− Vaut(y) = −
∫ m
y
(u¯(m)− u¯(x)) d
(y
x
)κ
.
Introducing a new variable s = xy , we rewrite the above as
V (y,m)− Vaut(y) = −
∫ m/y
1
(u¯(m)− u¯(sy))d
(
1
s
)κ
= κ
∫ m/y
1
(u¯(m)− u¯(sy))s−κ−1ds.
Thus Vy(y,m)− V ′aut(y) ≤ 0 and equality holds only if y = m.
(ii) Since κ > 1,
Vy(y,m) = κyκ−1m−κ(Vaut(m)− u¯(m))
is strictly increasing in y.
(iii)
V (y,m) =
(
1−
( y
m
)κ)
u¯(m) +
( y
m
)κ
Vaut(m)
= −
∫ m
y
u¯(m)d
(y
x
)κ − ( y
m
)κ ∫ ∞
m
u¯(x)d
(m
x
)κ
= −
∫ ∞
y
u¯(max{m,x})d
(y
x
)κ
.
Thus Vm(y,m) = −
∫m
y u¯
′(m)d
( y
x
)κ ≥ 0 with equality only if y = m.

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Proof of Lemma 3
(i) Differentiating (18) with respect to y we have
Zy(y,m) = κyκ−1m−κ
[
−
∫ ∞
m
u−1(u¯(x))d
(m
x
)κ − u−1(u¯(m))]− r
r − µ
> − r
r − µ.
Also, because κ > 1, Zy(y,m) increases with y and limy→0 Zy(y,m) = −r/(r − µ).
(ii) We can write (18) as
Z(y,m) = −
∫ ∞
y
u−1(u¯(max{x,m}))d
(y
x
)κ − r
r − µy.
From here we get that Zm(y,m) = −
∫m
y (u
−1)′(u¯(m))u¯′(m)d
( y
x
)κ ≥ 0 with equality only
if y = m.
(iii) By part (i), Zy(y,m) is monotonically increasing in y. Thus Zy(y,m)|y=m ≤ 0 im-
plies Zy(y,m) ≤ 0 for all y ≤ m. Otherwise, if Zy(y,m)|y=m > 0, then, by continuity,
Zy(y,m) > 0 for y sufficiently close to m. The sign of Zy(y,m)|y=m is the same as that
of dZ(y,y)dy |y=m because Zm(y,m)|y=m = 0 by part (ii).

Proof of Proposition 1
By Ito’s lemma
dAt =
−1
r − µµytdt+
−1
r − µσytdwt.
The flow constraint (24) will be satisfied with βt = − σytr−µ if we show that
−1
r − µµyt = rAt − ct + yt,
which is easy to check after substituting −yt rr−µ for rAt − ct. Thus, the proposed strategy is
budget-feasible for the agent because limt→∞E[e−rt(u−1(V¯ )/r − yt 1r−µ)] = 0. The optimality
of this trading strategy can be proved by a duality argument. Suppose not. Then, there is an
alternative trading strategy for the agent such that the consumption plan associated with it,
{c˜t; t ≥ 0}, delivers to the agent utility V˜ > V¯ . (This alternative consumption plan cannot
be constant because the constant consumption plan that delivers V˜ , i.e., ct = u−1(V˜ ), is not
budget-feasible for the agent.) But this means that the consumption allocation {c˜t; t ≥ 0}, if
used by the principal in the contracting problem (y0, V˜ ), could deliver to the agent the utility
V˜ > V¯ at the cost Cf (yt, V¯ ) < Cf (yt, V˜ ), which contradicts the optimality of the constant
consumption allocation ct = u−1(V˜ ) in the contracting problem (y0, V˜ ). 
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Proof of Proposition 2
We first show that the strategy {ct, At, βt; t ≥ 0} described in the statement of the proposi-
tion is feasible, then prove that it is optimal. Note that At = Z(yt, m¯t)/r = C(yt, V (yt, m¯t))/r ≥
C(yt, V (yt, yt))/r = Bt, thus the borrowing constraint is satisfied. Applying Ito’s lemma to the
martingale ∫ t
0
re−rs(cs − ys)ds+ e−rtZt(yt, m¯t),
we have that the drift of Zt is r(Zt + yt − ct)dt. Applying Ito’s lemma to Zt and noting that
m¯t is monotonically increasing (i.e., no volatility), we have
dZt = r(Zt + yt − ct)dt+ Zy(yt, m¯t)σytdwt.
Therefore,
dAt = (rAt + yt − ct)dt+ r−1Zy(yt, m¯t)σytdwt
= (rAt + yt − ct)dt+ βtdwt,
which shows that the policy {ct, At, βt; t ≥ 0} is budget-feasible to the agent.
To see that {ct, At, βt; t ≥ 0} is optimal, we must argue that the agent cannot do bet-
ter than V¯ . By contradiction, suppose the agent’s optimal plan is {c˜t, A˜t, β˜t; t ≥ 0} and
E
[∫∞
0 re
−rsu(c˜t)dt
]
> V¯ . Then the consumption allocation {c˜t; t ≥ 0} must satisfy the par-
ticipation constraints at every time and under all states because A˜t ≥ B(yt) for all t and the
continuation utility E
[∫∞
0 re
−rsu(c˜t+s)ds|Ft
]
is at least as large as Vaut(yt), due to the opti-
mality of {c˜t; t ≥ 0}. If the agent follows {c˜t, A˜t, β˜t; t ≥ 0}, the bank’s cost is still A0, because
the bank’s expected return on the fair-odds hedging asset is zero no matter what β˜t is. Thus,
we find an enforceable contract {c˜t; t ≥ 0} that incurs the same cost rA0 = C(y0, v0) to the
principal as {ct; t ≥ 0} but delivers a utility larger than V¯ . This contradicts the fact that higher
promised utility incurs higher cost, i.e., Zm(y,m) ≥ 0. 
Proof of Lemma 4
We have Wt = W (yt, m¯t) where
W (y,m) =
Z(y,m)
r
+
y
r − µ.
Thus,
Wy(y,m) =
Zy(y,m)
r
+
1
r − µ > 0,
where the strict inequality follows from Lemma 3(i). 
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Proof of Lemma 5
We have that St = S(yt, m¯t) where
S(y,m) =
Z(y,m)− Z(y, y)
r
.
We need to show that Sy(y,m) ≤ 0 with equality if and only if y = m. It thus suffices to show
that Zym(y,m) < 0. Differentiating (18) with respect to m we have
Zm(y,m) =
(
1−
( y
m
)κ)
(u−1)′(u¯(m))u¯′(m).
Thus
Zym(y,m) = −κyκ−1m−κ(u−1)′(u¯(m))u¯′(m) < 0.

Proof of Lemma 6
The volatility of St is
(
Zy(yt, m¯t)− dZ(yt,yt)dyt
)
σytdwt/r and the drift of St is
Z(yt, m¯t) + yt − u−1(u¯(m¯t))− 1
r
dZ(yt, yt)
dyt
µyt − 12
1
r
d2Z(yt, yt)
d(yt)2
(σyt)2.
It is easy to see that
(
Zy(yt, m¯t)− dZ(yt,yt)dyt
)
|yt=m¯t = 0, thus St has zero volatility when yt = mt
(i.e., when St = 0). To show that the drift when yt = m¯t is strictly positive, note that we have
dZ(y, y)
dy
= κy−1
[
−
∫ ∞
y
u−1(u¯(x))d
(y
x
)κ − u−1(u¯(y))]− r
r − µ,
d2Z(y, y)
dy2
= (κ2 − κ)y−2
[
−
∫ ∞
y
u−1(u¯(x))d
(y
x
)κ − u−1(u¯(y))]− κy−1(u−1)′(u¯(y))u¯′(y).
Thus
1
r
dZ(y, y)
dy
µy +
1
2
1
r
d2Z(y, y)
dy2
(σy)2
=
κµ+ 12(κ
2 − κ)σ2
r
[
−
∫ ∞
y
u−1(u¯(x))d
(y
x
)κ − u−1(u¯(y))]− µ
r − µy
−κσ
2y
2r
(u−1)′(u¯(y))u¯′(y)
=
[
−
∫ ∞
y
u−1(u¯(x))d
(y
x
)κ − u−1(u¯(y))]− µ
r − µy −
κσ2y
2r
(u−1)′(u¯(y))u¯′(y),
where the last equality uses (13). Thus, drift of St when yt = m¯t is
κσ2yt
2r
(u−1)′(u¯(yt))u¯′(yt) > 0.

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Proof of Lemma 7
Follows directly from Lemma 3(i). 
Proof of Lemma 8
Suppose there exists another borrowing constraint B˜(yt) and initial asset level A˜0 that also
implement the optimal allocation. Since in any implementation, the agent’s present value of
consumption must equal the present value of total wealth, the agent’s assets in his optimal
trading strategy must be At = Z(yt, m¯t)/r. Feasibility Z(yt, m¯t)/r ≥ B˜(yt) for all yt ≤ m¯t
requires that C(yt, Vaut(yt))/r = Z(yt, yt)/r ≥ B˜(yt), i.e., B(yt) ≥ B˜(yt) for all yt. To show
that B(yt) = B˜(yt) for all yt, suppose B(y∗) > B˜(y∗) for some y∗. Then there is a small
 > 0, such that B(y) > B˜(y) for all y ∈ (y∗ − , y∗ + ). Now, an agent with initial income y∗
and asset level A0 = C(y∗, Vaut(y∗))/r, instead of following the proposed equilibrium strategy
which delivers the value Vaut(y∗) , can achieve utility higher than Vaut(y∗). To do this, he can
consume yt+1 (and choose zero hedging, i.e., set βt = 0) for a short period of time, and default
immediately after his borrowing constraint binds for the first time. The agent’s utility from
this strategy is higher than the autarky value Vaut(y∗) because before he defaults he consumes
yt + 1, i.e., more than what he would consume in autarky. He is able to do this for a strictly
positive amount of time because the borrowing constraint is initially non-binding and B˜(·) is
continuous. 
Appendix B
This appendix provides a formal verification of the optimality of the contract (11).
First, we express the principal’s cost minimization problem as a dynamic programming
problem in a two-dimensional state vector (y, v), where y is the agent’s current level of income
and v is the current level of the continuation utility that the principal must provide to the
agent.
By Ito’s formula, yt satisfies
dyt = µytdt+ σytdwt, (32)
where µ = α+ σ2/2. In this representation, the income process is decomposed into a drift and
a volatility component. The same decomposition can be provided for the agent’s continuation
value process vt. In particular, the following proposition of Sannikov (2008) demonstrates how
the promised utility process v = {vt; t ≥ 0} defined in (3) can be decomposed into the sum of
a drift term and a volatility term.
Proposition 3 Let c be an allocation and v the promised utility process as defined in (3).
There exists a progressively measurable process Y = {Yt,Ft; 0 ≤ t <∞} such that
vt = v0 +
∫ t
0
r(vs − u(cs))ds+
∫ t
0
Ysdws.
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Put differently, the evolution of the promised utility process v implied by c can be decomposed
as
dvt = r(vt − u(ct))dt+ Ytdwt. (33)
This decomposition pins down the process Y uniquely up to a subset of measure zero.
Proof See Sannikov (2008). 
In this representation, r(vt − u(ct)) is the drift of the promised utility process vt and Yt as
the sensitivity of vt to income shocks dwt. Among useful properties of this representation is
Et[Ytdwt] = 0.
In our problem, the Dynamic Principle of Optimality (DPO) implies that continuation of
any efficient contract is itself efficient. Indeed, let c(y0, V¯ ) ∈ Ψ be an efficient contract in the
problem (y0, V¯ ) and suppose that c is applied over some time interval [0, t). At t, the agents’s
income is yt and his continuation utility is vt. The continuation allocation {ct+s(y0, V¯ ); s ≥ 0}
of the efficient contract c(y0, V¯ ) has to be the same as the efficient allocation starting at (yt, vt)
for otherwise c(y0, V¯ ) would not be efficient to begin with. Thus, for any date t and state
ω ∈ Ω,14 we have
ct(y0, V¯ ) = c0(yt, vt), (34)
where contracts on both sides are processes on (Ω,F ,P). By Proposition 1 both of these
contracts are a.e.-uniquely representable by drift and sensitivity components. Thus, (34) implies
that the sensitivity components of these representations are the same a.e.:
Yt(y0, V¯ ) = Y0(yt, vt), (35)
where Y (y, v) denotes the sensitivity process of the efficient contract c(y, v) for all (y, v) ∈ Θ.
In sum, the DPO implies that the efficient contracts in Ψ are representable by a pair of
real-valued functions (c0(yt, vt), Y0(yt, vt)), where c0 : Θ → R+ and Y0 : Θ → R. Because of
(34) and (35), these two functions (the so-called policy rules) can be used in (33) to express
the law of motion for the state variable (yt, vt) as
dyt = µytdt+ σytdwt,
dvt = r(vt − u(c0(yt, vt)))dt+ Y0(yt, vt)dwt.
This law of motion and the policy rules can be repeatedly applied to generate the sensitivity
process Y (y0, V¯ ) = {Yt(y0, V¯ ); t ≥ 0} and the contract allocation c(y0, V¯ ) = {ct(y0, V¯ ); t ≥ 0}
for any initial (y0, V¯ ) ∈ Θ.
The cost function C(yt, vt), i.e., the cost of an optimal contract starting from the state
(yt, vt), must satisfy the necessary Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation given as follows.
For the interior values of the state variable, i.e., for vt > Vaut(yt), the HJB equation is standard
(see, for example, Fleming and Soner (2006, equation (5.8), page 165)):
rC(yt, vt) = min
c,Y
{
r(c− yt) + Cy(yt, vt)µyt + Cv(yt, vt)r(vt − u(c))
+
σ2y2t
2
Cyy(yt, vt) + σytY Cvy(yt, vt) +
Y 2
2
Cvv(yt, vt)
}
, (36)
14Actually, the same is true for any stopping time T on (Ω,F ,P).
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where subscripts on C denote partial derivatives. At the boundary vt = Vaut(yt), the HJB is
the same except that the controls (c, Y ) must be such that vt+dt ≥ Vaut(yt+dt) with probability
one. Otherwise, the agent would revert to permanent autarky with positive probability, which
would be inefficient.
Denote the cost under the contract (11) Z(y,M(y, v)) by J(y, v). We can now show that
J(y, v) satisfies the HJB equation (36).
Proposition 4 J(y, v) satisfies the HJB equation.
Proof Consider a contract starting at (y0, V¯ ) = (y, v) ∈ Θ. Recall in the contract
u(ct) = u¯(mt) = u¯(M(yt, vt)). Define
Gt =
∫ t
0
re−rs(cs − ys)ds+ e−rtJ(yt, vt).
Because
Gt = E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rs(cs − ys)ds|Ft
]
,
we have that Gt is a martingale, and thus its drift is zero. Calculating this drift by applying
Ito’s lemma and the fact that the volatility of V (y,m) is Vyσy, and setting time equal to zero,
we get
r(u−1(u¯(m))− y)− rJ(y, v) + Jyµy + Jvr(v − u¯(m))
+
1
2
Jyy(σy)2 + Jyv(σy)2Vy +
1
2
Jvv(σy)2V 2y = 0,
which is the HJB equation, except for the minimization operator. To verify that in fact
r(u−1(u¯(m))− y)− rJ(y, v) + Jyµy + Jvr(v − u¯(m)) + 12Jyy(σy)
2 + Jyv(σy)2Vy +
1
2
Jvv(σy)2V 2y
= min
u,Y
{
r(u−1(u)− y) + Jyµy + Jvr(v − u) + 12Jyy(σy)
2 + JyvσyY +
1
2
JvvY
2
}
,
it suffices to show that Jv = (u−1)′(u¯(m)) and Vy = −Jvy/Jvv.
To see the first of these equalities, recall from the proof of Lemma 2(iii) that Vm =
− ∫my u¯′(m)d( yx)κ. Recall from the proof of Lemma 3(ii) that Zm = − ∫my (u−1)′(u¯(m))u¯′(m)d( yx)κ.
Since J(y, v) ≡ Z(y,M(y, v)), we have
Jv = ZmMv =
Zm
Vm
= (u−1)′(u¯(m)).
To see the second equality, note Jv(y, V (y,m)) = (u−1)′(u¯(m)) is independent of y when Jv
is interpreted as a function of (y,m). Thus, we have that Jvy+JvvVy = 0. Thus Vy = −Jvy/Jvv.
Therefore the HJB is verified. 
We have thus verified a necessary condition for optimality. The next proposition shows
sufficiency.
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Proposition 5 J = C, i.e., that the contract c constructed in (11) is efficient.
Proof Let N > 0 be any positive number and consider an initial state (y0, V¯ ) ∈ Θ(N) =
{(y, v) ∈ Θ : 0 < y ≤ N, v ≤ Vaut(N)}. Consider an auxiliary dynamic programming problem
in which the participation constraints are deleted (i.e., not required to hold) after the hitting
time λ = mint {t : vt = Vaut(N)}. Note that, since vt ≥ Vaut(yt) when t ≤ λ, we have λ ≤ τN .
An implication of deleting participation constraints is that the optimal consumption is perfectly
smoothed after λ, i.e., ct = u−1(Vaut(N)) for t ≥ λ, even as income yt continues to fluctuate.
To study the auxiliary problem, we can restrict attention to the interior of Θ(N), where the
law of motion of the state variable is the same as before. The cost function on the boundary
∂Θ(N) = {(y, v) ∈ Θ : v = Vaut(N)} is the full-commitment cost, i.e., C(N)(y, Vaut(N)) =
u−1(Vaut(N))− ryr−µ , because consumption is perfectly smoothed from the date λ on. The cost
function C(N)(y, v) in the interior is by definition the cost of the optimal policies in the auxiliary
dynamic programming problem. To solve the auxiliary problem, we make the same guess as
before, i.e., consumption is defined as in equation (9) in section 3 before τN . That is, for any
t < τN and mt < N ,
ct = u−1(u¯(mt)), (37)
where u¯ : R++ → R is
u¯(y) = Vaut(y)− κ−1yV ′aut(y). (38)
Any V¯ ∈ [Vaut(y), Vaut(N)] is uniquely associated with an m ∈ [y,N ], because V (y,m) =
(1− ( ym)κ)u¯(m) + ( ym)κVaut(m) is strictly increasing in m. We define, for m ∈ [y,N ],
Z(N)(y,m) = −
∫ N
y
u−1(u¯(max{x,m}))d
(y
x
)κ
+ u−1(Vaut(N))
( y
N
)κ − r
r − µy.
We first claim that for any (y, v) ∈ Θ(N), the function J (N) defined as J (N)(y, v) = Z(N)(y,M(y, v))
is the optimal cost function C(N)(y, v). To see this, note that J (N) satisfies the HJB on the
state space Θ(N),
rJ (N)(yt, vt) = min
c,Y
{
r(c− yt) + J (N)y (yt, vt)µyt + J (N)v (yt, vt)r(vt − u(c))
+
σ2y2t
2
J (N)yy (yt, vt) + σytY J
(N)
vy (yt, vt) +
Y 2
2
J (N)vv (yt, vt)
}
.
Pick any contract {c˜t; t ≥ 0} and denote the volatility process of v˜t in Proposition 1 by {Y˜t; t ≥
0}. We introduce, for each n ≥ 1, the stopping time
Tn = inf
t
{
t ≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
Y˜ 2s ds ≥ n or v˜t ≥ Vaut(N)
}
.
We define
Gt =
∫ t
0
re−rs(c˜s − ys)ds+ e−rtJ (N)(yt, v˜t).
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We apply the Ito’s lemma to Gt and obtain
Gt∧Tn = G0 +
∫ t∧Tn
0
e−rs
[
r(c˜s − ys)− rJ (N)(ys, v˜s) + J (N)y (ys, v˜s)µys + J (N)v (ys, v˜s)r(v˜s − u(c˜s))
+
σ2y2s
2
J (N)yy (ys, v˜s) + σysY˜sJ
(N)
vy (ys, v˜s) +
Y˜ 2s
2
J (N)vv (ys, v˜s)
]
ds
+
∫ t∧Tn
0
e−rs
[
J (N)y (ys, v˜s)σys + J
(N)
v (ys, v˜s)Y˜s
]
dws.
Since
∫ t∧Tn
0 e
−rs[J (N)y (ys, v˜s)σys+J
(N)
v (ys, v˜s)Y˜s]dws has zero mean and the drift is non-negative,
taking expectation, we see that
E(Gt∧Tn) ≥ G0 = J (N)(y0, V¯ ).
In particular E(Gn∧Tn) ≥ J (N)(y0, V¯ ). Since limn→∞ n ∧ Tn = λ, E[
∫∞
0 (c˜s)re
−rsds] < ∞ and
E[
∫∞
0 (ys)re
−rsds] <∞, the dominated convergence theorem yields
E
[∫ λ
0
re−rs(c˜s − ys)ds
]
= lim
n→∞E
[∫ n∧Tn
0
re−rs(c˜s − ys)ds
]
.
Furthermore, since J (N) is bounded, limn→∞ e−r(n∧Tn)J (N)(yn∧Tn , v˜n∧Tn) equals e−rλJ (N)(yλ, v˜λ) =
e−rλJ (N)(yλ, Vaut(N)) if λ <∞, and equals 0 if λ =∞. Thus
E
[
e−rλJ (N)(yλ, Vaut(N))
]
= lim
n→∞E
[
e−r(n∧Tn)J (N)(yn∧Tn , v˜n∧Tn)
]
.
We get
E
[∫ λ
0
re−rs(c˜s − ys)ds+ e−rλJ (N)(yλ, Vaut(N))
]
≥ J (N)(y0, V¯ ).
This means that J (N)(y0, V¯ ) is (weakly) less than the cost of any other contract {c˜t; t ≥ 0},
i.e., J (N) = C(N).
Since the auxiliary problem has less constraints than those in the original problem, we know
that the cost of the auxiliary problem is below that of the original problem, i.e., for all N > 0,
J (N)(y, v) ≤ C(y, v), for (y, v) ∈ Θ(N).
Taking limit N →∞, we have
J(y, v) = −
∫ ∞
y
u−1(u¯(max{x,m}))d
(y
x
)κ − r
r − µy
= lim
N→∞
(
−
∫ N
y
u−1(u¯(max{x,m}))d
(y
x
)κ
+ u−1(Vaut(N))
( y
N
)κ)− r
r − µy
= lim
N→∞
J (N)(y, v)
≤ C(y, v),
where m = M(y, v). Thus we have J(y, v) = C(y, v) for all (y, v) ∈ Θ. 
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Appendix C
Here we consider a discrete-time, one-sided commitment model in which the agent’s pref-
erences are represented by the expected utility function E[
∑∞
t=0(1 − β)βtu(ct)], with the dis-
count factor β ∈ (0, 1) and u strictly increasing and strictly concave. His income process
yt ∈ {y¯1, y¯2, ..., y¯n} is a Markov chain, where y¯1 < y¯2 < ... < y¯n. The transition probability pi
satisfies first-order stochastic dominance, i.e., pii(·) = Pr(·|yt = y¯i) first-order stochastic dom-
inates pij(·) = Pr(·|yt = y¯j), when i > j. If y0 = y¯i, let τi be the stopping time when income
exceeds y¯i for the first time, i.e., τi = min{t ≥ 0 : yt > y¯i}. Define
u¯(y¯i) =
E
[∑τi−1
t=0 β
tu(yt)|y0 = y¯i
]
E
[∑τi−1
t=0 β
t|y0 = y¯i
]
to be the average utility when income does not exceed y¯i. Using first-order stochastic dominance,
we can verify that u¯(y¯i) is strictly increasing in i.15 Now consider a contracting problem, where
y0 = y¯i and the agent’s promised utility is V¯ = Vaut(y¯i). Let mt = max0≤s≤t ys be the to-date
maximal realized income. We construct a contract as
ct = u−1(u¯(mt)). (39)
Note that the sequence {ct, t ≥ 0} is weakly increasing, because u¯ is increasing. Denote the
continuation value in the above contract by V (yt,mt). It is easily seen that the function V (y,m)
is increasing in m. To show that this contract satisfies all the participation constraints, note
that Z(y¯i, y¯i) = Vaut(y¯i) by the definition of u¯. Thus Z(yt,mt) ≥ Z(yt, yt) = Vaut(yt) for
all (yt,mt). To show that the contract is optimal, we verify that the sufficient and necessary
Lagrange conditions are satisfied. Borrowing notation from Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, page
660), let βtαt be the multiplier on
Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
(1− β)βs−tu(cs)
]
− Vaut(yt) ≥ 0, for t ≥ 1,
and let φ be the multiplier on
E
[ ∞∑
s=0
(1− β)βsu(cs)
]
− Vaut(y0) = 0.
We construct αt = (u−1)′(u(ct)) − (u−1)′(u(ct−1)) and φ = (u−1)′(u(c0)), which satisfies the
non-negativity of the multipliers since consumption is non-decreasing. It is easy to verify that
the analogs of the first-order conditions in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, equation 19.4.6a)
are satisfied by this construction. The analogs of the complementary slackness conditions in
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, equation 19.4.6b) are satisfied as well. This is because when
15Proof is available upon request.
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αt > 0, then ct > ct−1 and yt = mt > mt−1. Then participation constraint holds with equality
when αt > 0 because Z(y¯i, y¯i) = Vaut(y¯i) for all y¯i.
First-order stochastic dominance is necessary for the characterization in (39). The following
example shows that when no structure on the income process is imposed, then consumption
in the optimal contract can increase when income decreases. Take  ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose y0 = 1 with probability 1 and Pr(y1 = 1−|y0 = 1) = δ and Pr(y1 = 12 |y0 = 1) = 1−δ.
Assume also that Pr(yt+1 = 1−|yt = 1−) = 1 and Pr(yt+1 = 12t+1 |yt = 12t ) = 1, t ≥ 1. That is,
there is uncertainty only at the beginning of period 1 and income afterwards is either constant
or monotonically decreasing, depending on the realization of income in the first period. When
 is sufficiently small, the optimal contract to deliver to the agent the ex ante autarky value
Vaut(y0) involves only two consumption values. If income is y1 = 1 − , the agent consumes
1 −  in every period t ≥ 1 because of the binding participation constraint. If y1 = 1/2, the
participation constraint does not bind and it is efficient to smooth the consumption path at the
constant level, denoted here by c¯, at all t ≥ 0. In order to deliver Vaut(y0), consumption c¯ must
satisfy
(1− β)u(c¯) + (1− δ)βu(c¯) = (1− β)u(1) + (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
(1− β)βtu
(
1
2t
)
.
When  is sufficiently small, c¯ < 1 − . Thus, the optimal contract starts with consumption c¯
and jumps up to 1−  when income decreases from 1 to 1− .
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